Overview
The Internet Routing Registry (IRR) has evolved to meet a need for Internet-wide coordination. This need was described in RFC-1787, an informational RFC prepared on behalf of the IAB 14] .
The following summary appears in Section 7 of RFC-1787.
While ensuring Internet-wide coordination may be more and more di cult, as the Internet continues to grow, stability and consistency of the Internet-wide routing could signi cantly bene t if the information about routing requirements of various organizations could be shared across organizational boundaries. Such information could be used in a wide variety of situations ranging from troubleshooting to detecting and eliminating con icting routing requirements. The scale of the Internet implies that the information should be distributed. Work is currently underway to establish depositories of this information (Routing Registries), as well as to develop tools that analyze, as well as utilize this information.
A routing registry must maintain some degree of integrity to be of any use. The degree of integrity required depends on the usage of the routing policy system.
An initial intended usage of routing policy systems such as the RIPE database had been in an advisory capacity, documenting the intended routing policies for the purpose of debugging. In this role a very weak form of authentication was deemed su cient.
The IRR is increasingly used for purposes that have a stronger requirement for data integrity and security. This document addresses issues of data integrity and security that is consistent with the usage of the IRR and which avoids compromising data integrity and security even if the IRR is distributed among less trusted repositories.
Background
An early routing policy system used in the NSFNET, the policy routing database (PRDB), provided a means of determining who was authorized to announce speci c pre xes to the NSFNET backbone. The need for a policy database was recognized as far back as 1989 6, 4] . By 1991 the database was in place 5]. Authentication was accomplished by requiring con rmation and was a manually intensive process. This solved the problem for the NSFNET, but was oriented toward holding the routing policy of a single organization. 4 . AS numbers and IP address registries may be di erent entities from routing registries.
For subsets of any of these three allocation spaces, network addresses, AS numbers, and routes, these restrictions may be loosened or disabled by specifying a very weak authorization method or an authentication method of \none". However, even when no authentication mechanism is used, all involved parties can be noti ed about the changes that occurred through use of the existing \notify" attribute.
Scope of Security Coverage
This document is intended only to provide an authentication and authorization model to insure the integrety of the policy data in a registry. Only authetication and authorization of additions, deletions, and changes to the database are within the scope of this document. Authentication and authorization of database queries is explicitly out of scope. Mutual authentication of queries, that is authenticating both the origin of the query and the repository from which query results are obtained, is also out of scope.
Organization of this Document
Familiarity with RIPE-181 2] and RPSL 1] is assumed throughout this document. Goals are described in Section 6. Section 7 through Section 9 provide descriptions of the changes and discussion. Section 10 provides a concise summary of data formats and semantics. Appendix C through Appendix E provide additional technical discussion, examples, and deployment considerations.
Goals and Requirements Section 6 provides a more detailed description of the issues and identi es speci c problems that need to be solved, some of which require a degree of cooperation in the Internet community.
Data Representation Section 7 provides some characteristics of RPSL and formats for external representations of information.
Authentication Model Section 8 describes current practice, proposes additional authentication methods, and describes the extension mechanism if additional methods are needed in the future.
Authorization Model Section 9 describes the means of determining whether a transaction contains the authorization needed to add, modify, or delete speci c data objects, based on stated authentication requirements in related data objects.
Data Format Summaries Section 10 provides a concise reference to the data formats and steps in transaction processing.
Technical Discussion Section C contains some discussion of technical tradeo s. Common Operational Cases Section D provides some examples drawn from past operational experience with the IRR.
Deployment Considerations Section E describes some deployment issues and discusses possible means of resolution. Villamizar, et. al. Expires December 23, 2000 Page 4] 6 Goals and Requirements
The Internet is an open network. This openness and the large scale of the Internet can present operational problems. Technical weaknesses that allow miscon guration or errant operation in part of the network to propagate globally or which provide potentials for simple denial of service attacks should be eliminated to the extent that it is practical. The integrity of routing information is critical in assuring that tra c goes where it is supposed to.
An accidental miscon guration can direct tra c toward routers that cannot reach a destination for which they are advertising reachability. This is commonly caused by miscon gured static routes though there are numerous other potential causes. Static routes are often used to provide constant apparent reachability to single homed destinations. Some of the largest ISPs literally have thousands of static routes in their networks. These are often entered manually by operators. Mistyping can divert tra c from a completely unrelated destination to a router with no actual reachability to the advertised destination. This can happen and does happen somewhat regularly. In addition, implementation bugs or severe miscon gurations that result in the loss of BGP AS path information or alteration of pre x length can result in the advertisement of large sets of routes. Though considerably more rare, on a few occasions where this has occurred the results were catastrophic.
Where there is the potential for an accidental miscon guration in a remote part of the Internet a ecting the global Internet there is also the potential for malice. For example, it has been demonstrated by accident that multiple hour outages at a major institution can be caused by a laptop and a dial account if proper precautions are not taken. The dial account need not be with the same provider used by the major institution.
The potential for error is increased by the CIDR preference for more speci c routes 8]. If an institution advertises a single route of a given length and a distant router advertises a more speci c route covering critical hosts, the more speci c route, if accepted at all, is preferred regardless of administrative weighting or any routing protocol attributes.
There is a need to provide some form of checks on whether a route advertisement is valid. Today checks are typically made against the border AS advertising the route. This prevents accepting routes from the set of border AS that could not legitimately advertise the route. Theses checks rely on the use of information registered in the IRR to generate lists of pre xes that could be advertised by a speci c border AS. Checks can also be made against the origin AS. If policy information were su ciently populated, checks could be made against the entire AS path, but this is not yet feasible.
The use of a routing registry can also make it more di cult for pre xes to be used without authorization such as unallocated pre xes or pre xes allocated to another party.
In summary, some of the problems being addressed are:
Localizing the impact of accidental miscon guration made by Internet Providers to that provider's networks only. Eliminating the potential for an Internet provider's customer to use malicious miscon guration of routing as a denial of service attack if the provider route lters their customers. Localizing the denial of service to that Internet provider only if the immediate Internet service provider does not route lter their customers but other providers route lter the route exchange at the inter-provider peering.
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Eliminating the unauthorized use of address space.
If the data within a routing registry is critical, then the ability to change the data must be controlled. Centralized authorities can provide control but centralization can lead to scaling problems (and is politically distasteful).
Address allocation and name allocation is already delegated. Since delegation can be to outside registries it is at least somewhat distributed 11]. Autonomous System (AS) numbers are allocated by the same authorities. It makes sense to delegate the routing number space in a manner similar to the address allocation and AS number allocation. The need for this delegation of authority to numerous registries increases the di culty of maintaining the integrity of the body of information as a whole.
As a rst step, the database can be somewhat centrally administered with authority granted to many parties to change the information. This is the case with the current IRR. There are a very small number of well trusted repositories and a very large number of parties authorized to make changes. Control must be exercised over who can make changes and what changes they can make. The distinction of who vs what separates authentication from authorization.
Authentication is the means to determine who is attempting to make a change. Authorization is the determination of whether a transaction passing a speci c authentication check is allowed to perform a given operation.
Di erent portions of the database will require di erent methods of authentication. Some applications will require authentication based on strong encryption. In other cases software supporting strong encryption may not be necessary or may not be legally available. For this reason multiple authentication methods must be supported, selected on a per object basis through the speci cation of authentication methods in the maintainer object \auth" attribute. The authentication methods may range from very weak data integrity checks to cryptographicly strong signatures. The authorization model must insure that the use of weak integrity checks in parts of the database does not compromise the overall integrity of the database.
Additional requirements are placed on the authorization model if the database is widely distributed with delegations made to parties that may not be trustworthy or whose security practices may be lacking. This problem must be addressed in the authorization model in order to enable later evolution to a more distributed routing registry.
Autonomous system numbers can be delegated in blocks and subdelegated as needed and then individual AS numbers assigned. Address allocation is a simple numeric hierarchy. Route allocation is somewhat more complicated. The key attributes in a route object (key with regard to making it unique) contain both an address pre x and an AS number, known as the origin AS. The addition of a route object must be validated against the authorization criteria for both the AS and the address pre x. Route objects may exist for the same pre x with multiple origin AS values due to a common multihoming practice that does not require a unique origin AS. There is often no correlation between the origin AS of a pre x and the origin AS of overlapping more speci c pre xes.
There are numerous operational cases that must be accommodated. Some of the more common are listed below. These are explored in greater detail in Appendix D with discussion of technical tradeo s in Appendix C. Some database object types or database attributes must be added to RPSL to record the delegation of authority and to improve the authentication and authorization mechanisms. These additions are very few and are described in Section 8 and Section 9.
Some form of encapsulation must be used to exchange data. The de-facto encapsulation has been the one which the RIPE tools accept, a plain text le or plain text in the body of an RFC-822 formatted mail message with information needed for authentication derived from the mail headers or the body of the message. Merit has slightly modi ed this using the PGP signed portion of a plain text le or PGP signed portion of the body of a mail message. These very simple forms of encapsulation are suitable for the initial submission of a database transaction.
The encapsulation of registry transaction submissions, registry queries and registry responses and exchanges between registries is outside the scope of this document. The encapsulation of registry transaction submissions and exchanges between registries is outside the scope of this document.
Authentication Model
The maintainer objects serve as a container to hold authentication lters. A reference to a maintainer within another object de nes authorization to perform operations on the object or on a set of related objects. The maintainer is typically referenced by name in mnt-by attributes of objects. Further details on the use of maintainers are provided in Section 9.1.
The maintainer contains one or more \auth" attributes. Each \auth" attribute begins with a keyword identifying the authentication method followed by the authentication information needed to enforce pgp-from This format is being replaced by the \pgpkey" so that the public key certi cate will be available to remote repositories. This is Merit's PGP extension. The authentication information is a signature identity pointing to an external public key ring. The maintainer is authenticated if the transaction (currently PGP signed portion of a mail message) is signed by the corresponding private key.
pgpkey This keyword takes the form \PGPKEY-hhhhhhhh", where \hhhhhhhh" is the hex representation of the four byte id of the PGP public key used for authentication. The public key certi cate is stored in a separate object as described in 18].
Repositories may elect to disallow the addition of \auth" attributes specifying weaker forms of authentication and/or disallow their use in local transaction submissions. Repositories are encouraged to disallow the addition of \auth" attributes with the deprecated \pgp-from" method.
Any digital signature technique can in principle be used for authentication. Transactions should be signed using multiple digital signature techniques to allow repositories or mirrors that only use a subset of the techniques to verify at least one of the signatures. The selection of digital signature techniques is not within the scope of this document.
Authorization Model
The authorization model must accommodate the requirements outlined in Section 6. A key feature of the authorization model is the recognition that authorization for the addition of certain types of data objects must be derived from related data objects.
With multiple repositories, objects not found in RPSL are needed to control AS delegations and new attributes are needed in existing objects to control subdelegation. The de nition of RPSL objects used to implement a distrubuted routing registry system is not within the scope of this document.
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Maintainer Objects
The maintainer objects serve as a container to hold authentication lters. The authentication methods are described in Section 8. The maintainer can be referenced by name in other objects, most notably in the mnt-by attributes of those objects.
Maintainers themselves contain mnt-by attributes. In some cases the mnt-by in a maintainer will reference the maintainer itself. In this case, authorization to modify the maintainer is provided to a (usually very limited) set of identities. A good practice is to create a maintainer containing a long list of identities authorized to make speci c types of changes but have the maintainer's mnt-by attribute reference a far more restrictive maintainer more tightly controlling changes to the maintainer object itself.
The mnt-by attribute is mandatory in all objects. Some data already exists without mnt-by attributes. A missing mnt-by attribute is interpreted as the absence of any control over changes. This is highly inadvisable and most repositories will no longer allow this.
An additional maintainer reference can occur through a new attribute, \mnt-routes", and is used in aut-num, inetnum and route objects. The \mnt-routes" attribute is an extension to RPSL and is described in detail in Section 10.
A mnt-routes attribute in an aut-num object allows addition of route objects with that AS number as the origin to the maintainers listed. A mnt-routes attribute in an inetnum object allows addition of route objects with exact matching or more speci c pre xes. A mnt-routes attribute in a route object allows addition of route objects with exact matching or more speci c pre xes. A mnt-routes attribute does not allow changes to the aut-num, inetnum, or route object where it appears. A mnt-routes may optionally be constrained to only apply to a subset of more speci c routes.
Where \mnt-routes" or \mnt-lower" are applicable, any maintainer referenced in the \mnt-by" still apply. The set of applicable maintainers for whatever check is being made is the union of the \mnt-routes" or \mnt-lower" and the \mnt-by". For example, when authorizing a route object software would look at \mnt-routes", if it does not exist, look at \mnt-lower", if that does not exist look at \mnt-by".
as-block and aut-num objects
An \as-block" object is needed to delegate a range of AS numbers to a given repository. This is needed for authorization and it is needed to avoid having to make an exhaustive search of all repositories to nd a speci c AS. This search would not be an issue now but would be if a more distributed routing repository is used. Distributed registry issues are not within the scope of this document.
The \as-block" object also makes it possible to separate AS number allocation from registration of AS routing policy.
as-block: AS1321 -AS1335 ...
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The \aut-num" describes the routing policy for an AS and is critical for router con guration of that AS and for analysis performed by another AS. For the purpose of this document it is su cient to consider the aut-num solely as a place holder identifying the existence of an AS and providing a means to associate authorization with that AS when adding \route" objects.
The \as-block" object is proposed here solely as a means of recording the delegation of blocks of AS numbers to alternate registries and in doing so providing a means to direct queries and a means to support hierarchical authorization across multiple repositories.
inetnum objects
The \inetnum" exists to support address allocation. For external number registries, such as those using \ r]whoisd ++]" the \inetnum" can serve as a secondary record that is added when an address allocation is made in the authoritative database. Such records could be added by a address registry such as ARIN as a courtesy to the corresponding routing registry. 
route objects
Currently there are a quite few route objects in more than one registry. Quite a few are registered with an origin AS for which they have never been announced. There is a legitimate reason to be in more than one origin AS.
The \route" object is used to record routes which may appear in the global routing table. Explicit support for aggregation is provided. Route objects exist both for the con guration of routing information lters used to isolate incidents of erroneous route announcements (Section 6) and to support network problem diagnosis.
reclaim and no-reclaim attributes
A reclaim attribute is needed in as-block, inetnum and route objects. The reclaim attribute allows a control to be retained over more speci c AS, IP address or route space by allowing modify and delete privileges regardless of the mnt-by in the object itself.
The reclaim attribute provides the means to enforce address lending. It allows cleanup in cases where entities cease to exist or as a last resort means to correct errors such as parties locking themselves out of access to their own objects. To specify all more speci c objects the reclaim attribute value should be \ALL". To allow ner control a set of pre xes can be speci ed.
A no-reclaim attribute can be used to provide explicit exceptions. A reclaim attribute can only be added to an existing object if the addition of the reclaim attribute does not remove autonomy of existing more speci c objects that are covered by the new reclaim attribute.
1. A reclaim attribute can be added to an existing object if there are no existing exact matches or more speci c objects overlapped by the new reclaim attribute, or 2. if the submitter is listed in the maintainer pointed to by the mnt-by of the objects which are overlapped, or 3. if any overlapped object is listed in a no-reclaim attribute in the object where the reclaim is being added.
Similarly, a submitter may delete a no-reclaim attribute from an object only when that submitter is the only maintainer listed in the mnt-by attributes of any overlapped objects. If the submitter is not listed in any of the maintainers pointed to by the mnt-by attributes for one or more overlapped object, then the submitter is not permitted to delete the no-reclaim attribute.
If neither a reclaim or no-reclaim attribute is present, then more speci c objects of a given object cannot be modi ed by the maintainer of the less speci ed object unless the maintainer is also listed as a maintainer in the more speci c object. However, the addition of a new route or inetnum object must pass authentication of the largest less speci c pre x as part of the authentication check described in Section 9.9.
See Section 10 for a full description of the reclaim and no-reclaim attributes.
Other Objects
Many of the RPSL ancillary objects have no natural hierarchy the way AS numbers, Internet addresses and routes do have a numeric hierarchy. Some examples are \maintainers", \people" and \role" objects. For these objects, lack of any hierarchy leads to two problems.
1. There is no hierarchy that can be exploited to direct queries to alternate registries. At some point the query strategy of searching all known registries becomes impractical. 2. There is no hierarchy on which authorizations of additions can be based.
The rst problem can be addressed by considering the name space for each of the ancillary objects to be unique only within the local database and to use explicit references to an external repository where needed. To specify an external repository reference, the object key is preceded by the name of the repository and the delimiter \::". For example a NIC handle may take the form \RIPE::CO19". Currently there is a desire to keep NIC handles unique so the naming convention of appending a dash and the repository name is used. Prepending the repository name provides the unique name space since an object in the RIPE database referencing \CO19" would be interpreted as \RIPE::CO19" by default, but it would still be possible to query or reference \IANA::CO19". There is no possibility of accidentally forgetting to adhere to the conventions when making an addition and the existing objects are accommodated, including cases where name con icts have already occurred.
The second problem can be partially addressed by using a referral system for the addition of maintainers and requiring that any other object be submitted by a registered maintainer. The referral system would allow any existing maintainer to add another maintainer. This can be used in parallel with the addition of other object types to support the maintenance of those objects. For example, Villamizar, et. al.
when adding a subdomain to the \domain" hierarchy (in the RIPE repository where domains are also handled), even when adding a new domain to a relatively at domain such as \com", there is already a maintainer for the existing domain. The existing maintainer can add the maintainer that will be needed for the new domain in addition to adding the new domain and giving the new maintainer the right to modify it.
An organization gaining a presence on the Internet for the rst time would be given a maintainer. This maintainer may list a small number of very trusted employees that are authorized to modify the maintainer itself. The organization itself can then add another maintainer listing a larger set of employees but listing the more restrictive maintainer in the mnt-by attributes of the maintainers themselves. The organization can then add people and role objects as needed and any other objects as needed and as authorization permits.
Objects with AS Hierarchical Names
Many RPSL objects do not have a natural hierarchy of their own but allow hierarchical names. Some examples are the object types \as-set" and \route-set". An as-set may have a name corresponding to no naming hierarchy such as \AS-Foo" or it may have a hierarchical name of the form \AS1:AS-Bar".
When a hierarchical name is not used, authorization for objects such as \as-set" and \route-set" correspond to the rules for objects with no hierarchy described in Section 9.6.
If hierarchical names are used, then the addition of an object must be authorized by the aut-num whose key is named by everything to the left of the rightmost colon in the name of the object being added. Authorization is determined by rst using the mnt-lower maintainer reference, or if absent, using the mnt-by reference.
Query Processing
A query may have to span multiple repositories. All queries should be directed toward a local repository which may mirror the root repository and others. Currently each IRR repository mirrors all other repositories. In this way, the query may be answered by the local repository but draw data from others.
The mechanism below when applied to multiple repositories assumes the existence of an attribute for traversal of the repositories. The de nition of this attribute is considered a distributed registry issue and is out of scope of this document.
For object types that have a natural hierarchy, such as aut-num, inetnum, and route, the search begins at the root database and follows the hierarchy. For objects types that have no natural hierarchy, such as maintainer, person, and role objects, the search is con ned to a default database unless a database is speci ed. The default database is the same database as an object from which a reference is made if the query is launched through the need to follow a reference. Otherwise the default is generally the local database or a default set by the repository. The default can be speci ed in the query itself as described in Section 9.7.
In the absense of attributes to traverse multiple registries a search of all repositories is needed. With
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such attributes the search would proceed as follows. In searching for an AS, the delegation attribute in AS blocks can be consulted, moving the search to data from other repositories. Eventually the AS is either found or the search fails. The search for an inetnum is similar. Less speci c inetnums may refer the search to other databases. Eventually the most speci c inetnum is found and its status (assigned or not assigned) can be determined. The de nition of attributes for traversal of repositories is considered a distrbiuted registry issue and is not within the scope of this document.
The search for a route in the presence of attributes for the traversal of multiple registries is similar except the search may branch to more than one repository. The most speci c route in one repository may be more speci c than the most speci c in another. In looking for a route object it makes sense to return the most speci c route that is not more speci c than the query requests regardless of which repository that route is in rather than return one route from each repository that contains a less speci c overlap.
Adding to the Database
The root repository must be initially populated at some epoch with a few entries. An initial maintainer is needed to add more maintainers. The referral-by attribute can be set to refer to itself in this special case (Section 10 describes the referral-by). When adding an inetnum or a route object an existing exact match or a less speci c overlap must exist. A route object may be added based on an exact match or a less speci c inetnum. The root repository must be initially populated with the allocation of an inetnum covering the pre x 0/0, indicating that some address allocation authority exists. Similarly an initial as-block is needed covering the full AS number range.
When adding an object with no natural hierarchy, the search for an existing object follows the procedure outlined in Section 9.8.
When adding an aut-num (an AS), the same procedure used in a query is used to determine the appropriate repository for the addition and to determine which maintainer applies. The sequence of AS-block objects and repository delegations is followed. If the aut-num does not exist, then the submission must match the authentication speci ed in the maintainer for the most speci c AS-block in order to be added.
The procedure for adding an inetnum is similar. The sequence of inetnum blocks is followed until the most speci c is found. The submission must match the authentication speci ed in the maintainer for the most speci c inetnum overlapping the addition.
Adding a route object is somewhat more complicated. The route object submission must satisfy two authentication criteria. It must match the authentication speci ed in the aut-num and the authentication speci ed in either a route object or if no applicable route object is found, then an inetnum.
An addition is submitted with an AS number and pre x as its key. If the object already exists, then the submission is treated as a modify (see Section 9.10). If the aut-num does not exist on a route add, then the addition is rejected (see Section C for further discussion of tradeo s exists then the submission is checked against the applicable maintainer. A search is then done for the pre x rst looking for an exact match. If the search for an exact match fails, a search is made for the longest pre x match that is less speci c than the pre x speci ed. If this search succeeds it will return one or more route objects. The submission must match an applicable maintainer in at least one of these route objects for the addition to succeed. If the search for a route object fails, then a search is performed for an inetnum that exactly matches the pre x or for the most speci c inetnum that is less speci c than the route object submission. The search for an inetnum should never fail but it may return an unallocated or reserved range. The inetnum status must be \allocated" and the submission must match the maintainer.
Having found the AS and either a route object or inetnum, the authorization is taken from these two objects. The applicable maintainer object is any referenced by the mnt-routes attributes. If one or more mnt-routes attributes are present in an object, the mnt-by attributes are not considered.
In the absence of a mnt-routes attribute in a given object, the mnt-by attributes are used for that object. The authentication must match one of the authorizations in each of the two objects.
If the addition of a route object or inetnum contains a reclaim attribute, then any more speci c objects of the same type must be examined. The reclaim attribute can only be added if there are no more speci c overlaps or if the authentication on the addition is present in the authorization of a less speci c object that already has a reclaim attribute covering the pre x range, or if the authentication on the addition is authorized for the modi cation of all existing more speci c pre xes covered by the addition.
Modifying or Deleting Database Objects
When modifying or deleting any existing object a search for the object is performed as described in Section 9.8. If the submission matches an applicable maintainer for the object, then the operation can proceed. An applicable maintainer for a modi cation is any maintainer referenced by the mnt-by attribute in the object. For route and inetnum objects an applicable maintainer may be listed in a less speci c object with a reclaim attribute.
If the submission is for a route object, a search is done for all less speci c route objects and inetnums. If the submission is for an inetnum, a search is done for all less speci c inetnums. If the submission fails the authorization in the object itself but matches the reclaim attribute in any of the less speci c objects, then the operation can proceed. Section C contains discussion of the rationale behind the use of the reclaim attribute.
A modi cation to an inetnum object that adds a reclaim attribute or removes a no-reclaim attribute must be checked against all existing inetnums that are more speci c. The same check of the reclaim attribute that is made during addition must be made when a reclaim attribute is added by a modi cation (see Section 9.9).
A deletion is considered a special case of the modify operation. The deleted object may remain in the database with a \deleted" attribute in which case the mnt-by can still be consulted to remove the \deleted" attribute. A single attribute is represented as a single line with the name followed by a colon followed by whitespace characters (space, tab, or line continuation) and followed by the value. Within a value all whitespace is equivalent to a single space. Line continuation is supported by a backslash at the end of a line or the following line beginning with whitespace. When transferred, externally attributes are generally broken into shorter lines using line continuation though this is not a requirement. An object is externally represented as a series of attributes. Objects are separated by blank lines.
There are about 80 attribute types in the current RIPE schema and about 15 object types. Some of the attributes are mandatory in certain objects. Some attributes may appear multiple times. One or more attributes may form a key. Some attributes or sets of attributes may be required to be unique across all repositories. Some of the attributes may reference a key eld in an object type and may be required to be a valid reference. Some attributes may be used in inverse lookups.
A review of the entire RIPE or RPSL schema would be too lengthy to include here. Only the di erences in the schema are described.
Changes to the RIPE/RPSL Schema
One new object type and several attributes are added to the RIPE/RPSL schema. There are signi cant changes to the rules which determine if the addition of an object is authorized.
The new object type is listed below. The rst attribute listed is the key attribute and also serves as the name of the object type. In the above object type only the key attribute \as-block" is new:
as-block This attribute provides the AS number range for an \as-block" object. The format is two AS numbers including the substring \AS" separated by a \-" delimiter and optional whitespace before and after the delimiter.
In order to support stronger authentication, the following keywords are added to the \auth" attribute:
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pgp-from The remainder of the attribute gives the string identifying a PGP identity whose public key is held in an external keyring. The use of this method is deprecated in favor of the \pgpkey" method.
pgpkey See 18] .
In order to disable authentication and give permission to anyone, the authentication method \none" is added. It has no arguments.
An additional change is the \auth" attribute is allowed to exist in a \person" or \role" object. The \auth" method \role" or \person" can be used to refer to a role or person object and take the \auth" elds from those objects. Care must be taken in implementations to detect circular references and terminate expansion or the references already visited.
A few attributes are added to the schema. These are:
mnt-routes The mnt-routes attribute may appear in an aut-num, inetnum, or route object. This attribute references a maintainer object which is used in determining authorization for the addition of route objects. After the reference to the maintainer, an optional list of pre x ranges (as de ned in RPSL) inside of curly braces or the keyword \ANY" may follow. The default, when no additional set items are speci ed is \ANY" or all more speci cs. The mntroutes attribute is optional and multiple. See usage details in Section 9.1. mnt-lower The mnt-lower attribute may appear in an inetnum, route, as-block or aut-num object.
This attribute references a maintainer object. When used in an inetnum or route object the e ect is the same as a \mnt-routes" but applies only to pre xes more speci c than the pre x of the object in which it is contained. In an as-block object, mnt-lower allows addition of more speci c as-block objects or aut-num objects. In an aut-num object the mnt-lower attribute speci es a maintainer that can be used to add objects with hierarchical names as described in Section 9.7.
reclaim The reclaim attribute may appear in as-block, aut-num, inetnum, or route objects. Any object of the same type below in the hierarchy may be modi ed or deleted by the maintainer of the object containing a reclaim attribute. The value of the attribute is a set or range of objects of the same type where the syntax of the set or range is as de ned in RPSL. See Section 9.5 for restrictions on adding reclaim attributes.
no-reclaim The no-reclaim attribute is used with the reclaim attribute. The no-reclaim attribute negates any reclaim attribute it overlaps. See Section 9.5 for restrictions on deleting no-reclaim attributes.
referral-by This attribute is required in the maintainer object. It may never be altered after the addition of the maintainer. This attribute refers to the maintainer that created this maintainer. It may be multiple if more than one signature appeared on the transaction creating the object.
auth-override An auth-override attribute can be added, deleted, or changed by a transaction submitted by maintainer listed in the referral-by. An auth-override can only be added to a maintainer if that maintainer has been inactive for the prior 60 days. The auth-override attribute itself contains only the date when the attribute will go into e ect which must be at least 60 days from the current date unless there is already authorization to modify the maintainer. After the date in the auth-override is reached, those identi ed by the maintainer in the referral-by have authorization to modify the maintainer. This attribute exists as a means Villamizar, et. al. Expires December 23, 2000
to clean up should the holder of a maintainer become unresponsive and can only take e ect if that maintainer does not remove the auth-override in response to the automatic noti cation that occurs on changes.
The existing \mnt-by" attribute references the \maintainer" object type. The \mnt-by" attribute is now mandatory in all object types. A new maintainer may be added by any existing maintainer. The \referral-by" attribute is now mandatory in the \maintainer" object to keep a record of which maintainer made the addition and can never be changed. Maintainers cannot be deleted as long as they are referenced by a \referral-by" attribute elsewhere.
A Core and Non-Core Functionality
Most of the objects and attributes described in this document are essential to the authorization framework. These are referred to as being part of the \core" functionality. A few attributes listed here are considered \non-core".
The \reclaim" and \no-reclaim" attributes are a convenience to support exibility in the implementation of address lending.
The \auth-override" attribute is a convenience to facilitate recovery in an environment where repository data is redistributed in any way.
The \referal-by" attribute is a \core" feature. An individual registry may express its sutonomy by creating a self-referencing maintainer, one whose \referal-by" points to itslef. Other registries can decide on a case by case basis whether to consider such an entry valid. A registry may only allow the \referal-by" to refer to a speci c maintainer under the control of the registry. This further restriction is an issue that is purely local to the registry.
B Examples
The examples below leave out some required attributes that are not needed to illustrate the use of the objects and attributes described in this document. Missing are admin-c, tech-c, changed, source. Also missing are attributes such as mnt-nfy, whose use are a good practice but are not strictly required.
To do anything at all a maintainer is needed. At some epoch a a single maintainer is populated in one repository and that maintianer has a referal-by pointing to itself. All others referal-by references can be traced back to that maintainer. At the epoch the as-block AS0-AS65535 and the inetnum 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255 are also allocated. Other ancilliary object may also be needed to bootstrap. Note that the WIZARDS can change their own maintainer object and the MORTALS maintainer object but MORTALS cannot.
At some point an as-block is allocated and broken down. In the example below, private number space is used.
as-block: AS65500-AS65510 mnt-by: SOME-REGISTRY mnt-lower: WIZARDS Note that a registry has control over the object that they have created representing the allocation, but have given the party to which the allocation was made the ability to create more speci c objects. Below this as-block, an aut-num is added. Note that import and export are normally required for a aut-num but are not shown here.
aut-num: AS65501 mnt-by: WIZARDS mnt-lower: MORTALS
In aut-num above the WIZARDS maintainer can modify the aut-num itself. The MORTALS maintainer can add route objects using this AS as the origin if they also have authorization for the IP number space in a less speci c route or inetnum.
We also need an inetnum allocation. In this example the inetnum is allocated to a completely di erent organization. Again attributes are omited which would normally be needed in an inetnum. The maintainer ISP can add more speci c inetnums or routes with this address space. Note that the registry has declared their ability to reclaim the address space.
If ISP wished to reclaim all allocations but some suballocation of theirs resisted, we might get something like the following in which they will reclaim only the top half of an allocation (possibly if it remains unused). If we assume that the maintainer EBG-COM and the maintainer MORTALS want to add a route object, one way to do it is for both parties to sign. If EBG-COM for some reason couldn't aggregate an allocate a single top level route (which is inexcusable these days) or there was a preference for some reason to avoid the joint signature approach on a submission either party could give the other permission to make the addition. A mnt-routes could be added to the aut-num or a mnt-lower could be added to an inetnum. With this change to the aut-num the maintainer EBG-COM could add a route with origin AS65501, but only with a limited address range. Note that while the maintainer EBG-COM added the object they allowed the maintainer MORTALS the ability to modify it.
If an object ended up in another repository, a single maintainer could still be used. In the example above the notation FICTION::MORTALS indicates that the route object is in a di erent repository and rather than duplicate the maintainer, a reference is made to the repository in which the MORTALS object resides.
In the example below, a pair of route-sets are added and hierarchical names are used. EBG-COM Suppose in the 192.168.144/24 object above, only the EBG-COM maintainer is listed. If EBG-COM goes bankrupt, no longer needs address space, and stops responding, it could be di cult to delete this object. The maintainer listed in the EBG-COM referral-by attribute could be contacted. They could add a auth-override attribute to the EBG-COM object. Later they could modify the EBG-COM object and then any objects with EBG-COM in the mnt-by.
mntner: EBG-COM mnt-by:
EBG-COM auth-override: 19990401
The examples above stray signi cantly from realism. They do provide simple illustrations of the usage of the objects type and attributes described in this document and hopefully in doing some are of some value.
C Technical Discussion
A few design tradeo s exist. Some of these tradeo s, the selected solution, and the alternatives are discussed here. Some of the issues are listed below.
1. Whether to err on the side of permissiveness and weaken authorization controls or risk the possibility of erecting barriers to registering information. 2. Whether to support enforcible address lending or provide the smaller or end user with ultimate control over the registration of the pre xes they are using. 3. What to do with older objects that either don't conform to newer requirements regarding minimum authorization, authentication, and accountability, or are of questionable validity.
C.1 Relaxing requirements for ease of registry
If the requirement that an aut-num exists is relaxed, then it is possible for anyone to make use of an unassigned AS number or make use of an assigned AS number for which the aut-num has not been entered. Placing requirements on the entry of aut-num presumes cooperation of the Internet address allocation authority (if separate from the routing registry). The address allocation authority must be willing to eld requests to populate skeleton aut-nums from the party for which the allocation has been made. These aut-num must include a reference to a maintainer. A request to the address allocation authority must therefore include a reference to an existing maintainer.
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The ability to add route objects is also tied to the existence of less speci c route objects or inetnums. The Internet address allocation authority (if separate from the routing registry) must also be willing to eld requests to add inetnum records for the party already allocated the address space.
The Internet address allocation authority should also add inetnums and aut-nums for new allocations. In order to do so, a maintainer must exist. If a party is going to connect to the Internet, they can get a maintainer by making a request to the Internet service provider they will be connecting to. Once they have a maintainer they can make a request for address space or an AS number. The maintainer can contain a public key for a cryptographicly strong authorization method or could contain a \crypt-key" or \mail-to" authorization check if that is considered adequate by the registering party.
Furthermore an address allocation authority should verify that the request for an AS number or for address space matches the authorization criteria in the maintainer.
Currently only the registries themselves may add maintainers. This becomes a problem for the registry, particularly in verifying public keys. This requirement is relaxed by allowing existing maintainers to add maintainers. Unfortunately the accountability trail does not exist for existing maintainers. The requirement then should be relaxed such that existing maintainers may remain but only existing maintainers that have a \referral-by" attribute can add maintainers. The \referral-by" cannot be modi ed. This requirement can be relaxed slightly so that a \referral-by" can be added to a maintainer by an existing maintainer with a \referral-by". This will allow the accountability trail to be added to existing maintainers and these maintainers can then add new maintainers.
Verifying that a party is who they claim to be on initial addition, is one of the problems that currently falls upon the AS number and address registry. This problem is reduced by allowing existing maintainers to add maintainers. This may actually make it easier to get maintainers and therefore easier to register. The number authority still must verify that the AS or address space is actually needed by the party making a request.
Authorization checks made during the addition of route objects that refer to AS objects and inetnums strongly rely on the cooperation of the Internet address allocation authorities. The number authorities must register as-blocks, aut-nums, or inetnums as AS numbers or address space is allocated. If only a subset of the number authorities cooperate, then either an inetnum or as-block can be created covering the space that registry allocates and essentially requiring null allocation (for example a \crypt-pw" authentication where the password is given in the remarks in the object or its maintainer) or those obtaining addresses from that number authority will have trouble registering in the routing registry. The authorization model supports either option, though it would be preferable if the number authorities cooperated and the issue never surfaced in practice.
The maintainer requirements can be relaxed slightly for existing maintainers making it easier to register. Relaxing requirements on other objects may defeat the authorization model, hence is not an option.
C.2 The address lending issue
The issue of whether lending contracts should be enforcible is an issue of who should ultimately be able to exercise control over allocations of address space. The routing registry would be wise to stay as neutral as possible with regard to disputes between third parties. The \reclaim" and \no-reclaim" are designed to allow either outcome to the decision as to whether the holder of a less speci c inetnum or route object can exercise control over suballocations in the registry. The routing Villamizar, et. al. Expires December 23, 2000 registry itself must decide whether to retain control themselves and if so, should very clearly state under what conditions the registry would intervene. A registry could even go to the extreme of stating that they will intervene in such a dispute only after the dispute has been resolved in court and a court order has been issued.
When an allocation is made by a registry, the registry should keep a \reclaim" attribute in the less speci c object and make a strong policy statement that the reclaim privilege will not be used except under very clearly de ned special circumstances (which at the very minimum would include a court order). If the allocation is further subdivided the party subdividing the allocation and the party accepting the suballocation must decide whether a \reclaim" can be kept by the holder of the less speci c allocation or whether a \no-reclaim" must be added transferring control to the holder of the more speci c. The registry is not involved in that decision. Di erent pairs of third parties may reach di erent decisions regarding the \reclaim" and any contractual restrictions on its use that may be expressed outside of the registry in the form of a legal contract and ultimately resolved by the courts in the event of a bitter dispute.
By retaining \reclaim" rights the registry retains the ability to abide by a court order. This may only truly become an issue in a distributed registry environment where registries will be rechecking the authorization of transactions made elsewhere and may fail to process the attempt of another registry to abide by a court order by overriding normal authorization to change the registry contents if a reclaim is not present.
C.3 Dealing with non-conformant or questionable older data
Some of the newer requirements include requiring that all objects reference a maintainer object responsible for the integrity of the object and requiring accountability for the creation of maintainers to be recorded in the maintainer objects so that accountability can be traced back from an unresponsive maintainer. In the event that contact information is absent or incorrect from objects and there is any question regarding the validity of the objects, the maintainer can be contacted. If the maintainer is unresponsive, the maintainer that authorized the addition of that maintainer can be contacted to either update the contact information on the maintainer or con rm that the entity no longer exists or is no longer actively using the Internet or the registry.
Many route objects exist for which there are no maintainers and for which inetnum and AS objects do not exist. Some contain the now obsoleted guardian attribute rather than a mnt-by.
It is not practical to unconditionally purge old data that does not have maintainers or does not conform to the authorization hierarchy. New additions must be required to conform to the new requirements (otherwise the requirements are meaningless). New requirements can be phased in by requiring modi cations to conform to the new requirements.
A great deal of questionable data exists in the current registry. The requirement that all objects have maintainers and the requirements for improved accountability in the maintainers themselves may make it easier to determine contact information even where the objects are not updated to re ect contact information changes.
It is not unreasonable to require valid contact information on existing data. A great deal of data appears to be unused, such as route objects for which no announcement has been seen in many months or years. An attempt should be made to contact the listed contacts in the object, in the Villamizar, et. al.
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maintainer if there is one, then up the maintainer referral-by chain if there is one, and using the number registry or origin AS contact information if there is no maintainer accountability trail to follow. Experience so far indicates that the vast majority of deletions identi ed by comparing registered pre xes against route dumps will be positively con rmed (allowing the deletion) or there will be no response due to invalid contact information (in many cases the IRR contact information points to nsfnet-admin@merit.edu).
By allowing the registry to modify (or delete) any objects which are disconnected from the maintainer accountability trail, cleanup can be made possible (though mail header forging could in many cases have the same e ect it is preferable to record the fact that the registry itself made the cleanup). Similarly, a mechanism may be needed in the future to allow the maintainer in the referral-by to override maintainer privileges in a referred maintainer if all contacts have become unresponsive for a maintainer. The referral-by maintainer is allowed to add an \auth-override" attribute which becomes usable as an \auth" within 60 days from the time of addition. The maintainer themselves would be noti ed of the change and could remove the \auth-override" attribute before it becomes e ective and inquire as to why it was added and correct whatever problem existed. This can be supported immediately or added later if needed.
D Common Operational Cases
In principle address allocation and route allocation should be hierarchical with the hierarchy corresponding to the physical topology. In practice this is often not the case for numerous reasons. The primary reasons are the topology is not strictly tree structured and the topology can change. More speci cly:
1. The Internet topology is not strictly tree structured. At the top level the network more closely resembles a moderately dense mesh. Near the bottom level many attachments to the Internet are multihomed to more than one Internet provider. 2. The Internet topology can and does change.
Many attachments switch providers to obtain better service or terms. Service providers may modify adjacencies to obtain better transit service or terms. Service providers may disappear completely scattering attachments or they may merge.
Renumbering is viewed as a practical means to maintain a strict numeric hierarchy 16]. It is also acknowledged that renumbering IPv4 networks can be di cult 16, 3, 17] . We examine rst the simple case where hierarchy still exists. We then examine the operational cases where either initial topology is not tree structured or cases where topology changes.
D.1 simple hierarchical address allocation and route allocation
This is the simplest case. Large ranges of inetnums are assigned to address registries. These registries in turn assign smaller ranges for direct use or to topologically large entities where allocations according to topology can reduce the amount of routing information needed (promote better route aggregation).
AS objects are allocated as topology dictates the need for additional AS 10] . Route objects can be registered by those with authorization given by the AS and by the address owner. This is never an issue where the maintainer of the AS and the inetnum are the same. Where they di er, either the provider can give permission to add route objects for their AS, or the party allocated the address space can give the provider permission to add route objects for their address space, or both parties can sign the transaction. Permission is provided by adding to maintainer attributes.
D.2 aggregation and multihomed more speci c routes
Aggregation is normally not a problem if a provider is aggregating address space allocated to the provider and then suballocated internally and/or to customers. In fact, the provider would be expected to do so. This is not a problem even if the route object for the aggregation is added after the more speci c route objects since only less speci c objects are considered.
Aggregation is potentially a problem if a provider or a set of providers plan to aggregate address space that was never explicitly allocated as a block to those providers but rather remains the allocation of a address registry. These large aggregations can be expected to be uncommon, but relatively easily dealt with. Superaggregates of this type will generally be formed by topologically close entities who have also managed to draw adjacent address allocations. In e ect, the registry must give permission to form such a superaggregate by either giving permission to do so in the mnt-routes of an inetnum or by signing the submission along with the other parties.
D.3 provider independent addresses and multiple origin AS
Provider independent addresses and multihoming arrangement using multiple origin AS present a similar problem to multihoming. The maintainer of the address space and the maintainer of the AS is not the same. Permission can be granted using mnt-routes or multiple signatures can appear on the submission.
D.4 change in Internet service provider
A change in Internet service providers is similar to multihoming. A minor di erence is that the AS for the more speci c route will be the AS of the new provider rather than the AS of the multihomed customer. Permission can be granted using mnt-routes or multiple signatures can appear on the submission.
D.5 renumbering grace periods
Renumbering grace periods allow a provider who wants to keep an address allocation intact to allow a customer who has chosen to go to another provider to renumber their network gradually and then return the address space after renumbering is completed. immediate renumbering or o er renumbering grace periods and how long they should be or whether they should be inde nite has been topic of bitter disputes. The authorization model can support no renumbering grace period, a nite renumbering grace period, or an inde nite renumbering grace period. The \reclaim" attribute described in Section 9.1 provides a means to end the grace period.
E Deployment Considerations
This section describes deployment considerations. The intention is to raise issues and discuss approaches rather than to provide a deployment plan.
The use of routing registries is not yet universally accepted. There still remain Internet providers who see no reason to provide the added assurance of accurate routing information described in Section 6. More accurately, these bene ts are viewed as being insu cient to justify the cost. This has been largely caused an inability of a very major router vendor up until recently to handle pre x lists of the size needed to specify routing policy on a per pre x basis. Another reason cited is that ltering on a pre x basis in an environment where routing registry information is incomplete or inaccurate can interfere with connectivity.
There clearly is a critical mass issue with regard to the use of routing registries. A minority of providers use the existing IRR to lter on a per pre x basis. Another minority of providers do not support the IRR and generally fail to register pre xes until connectivity problems are reported. The majority of providers register pre xes but do not implement strict pre x ltering.
Deploying new authentication mechanisms has no adverse consequences. This has been proven with Merit's deployment of PGP.
In deploying new authorization mechanisms, a major issue is dealing with existing data of very questionable origin. A very large number of route objects refer to pre xes that have not been announced for many years. Other route objects refer to pre xes that are no longer announced with the origin AS that they are registered with (some were incorrectly registered to start with). There are many causes for this.
1. During the transition from the NSFNET PRDB to the RADB a large number of pre xes were registered with an origin AS corresponding to the border AS at which the NSFNET had once heard the route announcements. The PRDB did not support origin AS, so border AS was used. Many of these routes were no longer in use at the time and are now routed with a submitter listed as \nsfnet-admin@merit.edu". 2. As CIDR was deployed, aggregates replaced previously separately announced more speci c pre xes. The route objects for the more speci c pre xes were never withdrawn from the routing registries. 3. Some pre xes are simply no longer in use. Some networks have been renumbered. Some network no longer exist. Often the routing registry information is not withdrawn. 4. As provider AS adjacencies changed and as end customers switched providers often the actual origin AS changed. This was often not re ected by a change in the routing registry.
Expires December 23, 2000specific route(s) ) authorization fails /* now check for a "reclaim" attr */ if ( the object has a "reclaim" attribute ) if ( no more-specifics exist OR a less specific exists which passes authorization and has a "reclaim" attribute OR all more specifics routess pass modify authorization ) authorization passes else authorization fails ] else authorization passes ] /* there are no less specific routes to check for prefix authentication, so we need to try and get authorization from an inetnum object */ if ( ( an inetnum is found that is an exact match OR is less specific and it's status is "allocated" ) AND a maintainer referenced by the inetnum passes authorization ) authorization succeeds /* if there is no inetnum or route object then then authorization fails. This should never happen if the DB is initialized properly. */ authorization fails.
Case #2. Route object modify/delete (ie, exact prefix/origin match exists).
if ( the mnt-by passes authorization ) authorization succeeds /* if the authorization did not pass from the matched object, we can still get authorization from a less specific route if it has a "reclaim" attribute and we pass authorization */ if ( a less specific route or inetnum object passes authorization AND has a "reclaim" attribute applicable to the object to be modified ) authorization succeeds else authorization fails Villamizar, et. al. Expires December 23, 2000 
